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T R U T H  I N  L E N D I N G  A C T
Mortgage Lending: When Does a Borrower’s Right to Rescind  
a Mortgage Loan Under the Truth in Lending Act Expire?
CASE AT A GLANCE 
The Truth in Lending Act permits a borrower to rescind a loan secured by a mortgage on the borrower’s 
principal residence by notifying to the lender within the first three days after the loan is made, or within 
three days of receiving loan disclosure forms if those forms are not provided at closing. This right expires 
three years after the loan is originated. In this case, the Court must decide whether that three-year limit 
refers to notifying the lender of the decision to rescind, or to filing an actual suit for rescission. 
Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans
Docket No. 13-684
Argument Date: November 4, 2014
From: The Eighth Circuit 
by Marshall Tracht
New York Law School, New York, NY
INTRODUCTION
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires that lenders make certain 
disclosures to potential borrowers to ensure that borrowers have 
the opportunity to understand the terms of the loan they are taking 
and to shop for credit with full information. Section 1635(a) of 
TILA provides a borrower with the right to rescind a loan secured 
by the borrower’s principal residence before midnight on the third 
business day after the loan is consummated “by notifying the 
creditor, in accordance with regulations of the [Consumer Finance 
Protection] Bureau, of his intention to do so.” However, to give 
teeth to the act’s disclosure requirements, it provides that if the 
borrower is not provided at closing with proper disclosures and 
notice of the right to rescind, the deadline to rescind the transaction 
is extended until three days after those materials are provided. 
As originally passed, TILA did not include any time limit on the 
borrower’s right to rescind if the lender did not comply with its 
disclosure requirements. In 1974, however, Congress added section 
1635(f), under which the right to rescind expires three years after 
the consummation of the loan even if the lender has never provided 
the required disclosures and forms. The courts of appeals have split 
on the effect of section 1635(f), with the Third, Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits holding that it is enough if the borrower provides notice 
of rescission before the right expires’ and the First, Sixth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits holding that if the lender objects to 
rescission, the borrower must actually bring suit within that three-
year period.
The TILA rescission provisions were initially drafted with a primary 
focus on home improvement scams and reflect the facts of such 
cases rather than the mortgage loan issues that loom so large today. 
Section 1635(b) of TILA provides a specific sequence of events for 
rescission. Within 20 days after receiving a notice of rescission, the 
creditor must terminate its security interest in the property (the 
mortgage). After this is done, the borrower must tender payment 
of the debt to the creditor. The borrower has an absolute right to 
rescind within the first three days after closing or receipt of the 
required disclosures, and the prescribed sequence of actions fits 
such rescissions well. 
However, TILA does not directly address the possibility that 
a creditor might contest the borrower’s right to rescind the 
transaction nor explain how such disputes should be handled, 
giving rise to the present controversy. The statute seems to 
assume that every notice of intent to rescind will be justified and 
a rapid nonjudicial remedy is therefore appropriate. So a single 
set of rescission provisions essentially applies to two dramatically 
different situations: uncontested rescissions (whether in the first 
three days, or because the creditor concedes a TILA violation or 
otherwise consents) and contested ones. Automatic and rapid 
rescission is appropriate in the former case, and problematic in the 
latter.
ISSUE
May a borrower rescind a mortgage loan for violation of the Truth in 
Lending Act by sending a notice of rescission within the three-year 
window provided by section 1635(f) and bringing suit thereafter if 
the creditor objects, or must the borrower actually file suit within 
that three-year period? 
FACTS
On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski borrowed 
$611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. to refinance their 
mortgage. Exactly three years later, on February 23, 2010, they 
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mailed a letter notifying the lender that they were rescinding the 
loan because of violations of the Truth in Lending Act. (The alleged 
violation was providing the borrowers with one copy of the Truth in 
Lending Disclosure Statement and Notice of Right to Cancel, rather 
than two copies as required by the governing regulations.) The 
lender denied their demand to rescind the transaction, disputing 
whether TILA had been violated, and on February 24, 2011, the 
borrowers filed suit to rescind the loan and for damages for the 
lender’s refusal to grant the rescission. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed 
the suit because it was filed more than three years after the 
consummation of the loan. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed, although two of the three judges specifically noted 
that they did so only because they were bound by an earlier Eighth 
Circuit case and that if the issue was still open in their circuit they 
would have ruled for the borrowers. The Jesinoskis filed a petition 
for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. 
CASE ANALYSIS
The Jesinoskis, petitioners before the Court, argue that they 
rescinded the loan before the right of rescission expired because 
the right is exercised by providing notice to the creditor, which 
they did within the three-year period provided by section 1635(f). 
Respondent argues providing notice of rescission does not 
automatically result in rescission if the lender contests the right 
to rescind, and that section 1635(f) is a statute of repose requiring 
that any suit to rescind be filed within its three-year period. 
Petitioners’ argument begins with the plain meaning of the words 
of section 1635(a), which, they argue, unambiguously provide for 
rescission to be accomplished by notice: “the obligor shall have 
the right to rescind the transaction … by notifying the creditor, in 
accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do 
so.” Section 1635(b) specifies the further steps in the rescission 
process, providing that within 20 days of receipt of the notice the 
lender must cancel the mortgage. Once that is done, the borrower 
must tender repayment of the loan to the lender. This provides 
a simple, expeditious nonjudicial remedy for borrowers, under 
which rescission is accomplished by notice, rather than a judicial 
determination of a TILA violation. 
In support, petitioners argue that section 1635 was “intended 
to codify long-settled principles of rescission law,” under which 
rescission could be accomplished by providing notice of the 
rescission and returning any consideration to the other party. No 
suit was required to rescind the transaction, although a suit might 
have been needed after rescission to compel restitution from the 
other side.
According to petitioners, section 1635(f), which provides that the 
right to rescind “shall expire” after three years, does not change 
the fact that rescission is accomplished by notice, without filing 
suit, and does not establish any limitation on when such a suit 
may be filed (provided the notice is given within the three years). 
Petitioners contrast section 1635(f), which says that the “right of 
rescission shall expire,” with the typical language used in a statute 
of limitations, which will refer to the time limit for commencing an 
action or filing a suit. For example, section 1640(e), which applies 
to suits for damages for violation of TILA, states that “any action 
under this section may be brought … within one year from the date 
of the occurrence of the violation.”
Moreover, petitioners argue, TILA expressly authorized the Federal 
Reserve Board (and now the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
which took over responsibility after the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Act) to enact implementing regulations. Regulation Z, adopted in 
1969, provides that
to exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall 
notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram 
or other means of written communication. Notice is 
considered given when mailed, when filed for telegraphic 
transmission or, if sent by other means, when delivered to 
the creditor’s designated place of business.
Neither the statute nor the regulations state that the borrower 
must bring suit in order to rescind. Petitioners argue that the 
interpretation of TILA embodied in these regulations is a reasonable 
one that is entitled to deference by the courts. Further, Congress 
has repeatedly amended TILA in the forty years since Reg. Z was 
adopted, including various amendments to the rescission provisions, 
without ever changing the method of rescission set forth in section 
1635(a), thereby acquiescing in the Board’s interpretation. In 1977, 
for example, Congress considered but rejected an amendment to 
create a cause of action “to determine the consumer’s right to 
rescind”; in 1980 it narrowed the range of transactions in which 
rescission rights were available, and in 1995 it expanded the use of 
rescission as a defense in foreclosure proceedings. In none of these 
enactments, however, did Congress amend the means of rescinding 
(by notice to the creditor) laid out in section 1635(a) and Reg. Z. 
Respondent argues that the regulations are entitled to no deference, 
as they are at odds with TILA’s clear requirements. Further, the 
regulations explain what is required to provide the notice of 
intention to rescind under section 1635(a), but say nothing about 
the acts a borrower must take to obtain resolution of a contested 
rescission or when those acts must be taken.  
Respondent agrees that TILA codifies common-law rescission but 
disagrees on what that means. Under TILA, the borrower has an 
unconditional right to rescind within three days of receiving the 
statutory disclosures, but rescission after that depends on whether 
the lender has violated TILA. Within the first three days after loan 
documents are executed, rescission is simple and straightforward, 
as laid out in sections 1635(a) and (b), particularly because loan 
funds are normally not disbursed to the borrower until after the 
three-day period has passed. 
Rescission for a TILA violation, however, is “problematic” because 
the funds have been disbursed, mortgage recorded, and the right to 
rescind may be contested by the lender. If the lender contests the 
right to rescind, respondent argues, the steps laid out in section 
1635(b) “will not take place and must be established by judicial 
resolution.” According to respondent, TILA “prescribes a different 
procedure” in such cases, offering a cause of action under section 
1635(g) in which a court may “award” rescission. 
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Section 1635(g) states, in its entirety, that “[i]n any action in 
which it is determined that a creditor has violated this section, in 
addition to rescission the court may award relief under section 1640 
of this title for violation of this subchapter not relating to the right 
to rescind.” Petitioners argue that this language acknowledges 
that rescission may be awarded by a court but, according to their 
reading, it neither creates a cause of an action for rescission nor 
requires that a borrower file suit in order to rescind. It simply allows 
a court to award both rescission and damages if an action by the 
borrower or a government agency results in a determination that 
TILA was violated. 
Respondent argues that the need for a judicial proceeding in order 
for rescission to take effect over the lender’s objection is reinforced 
by the common law, which recognized two means of rescission. 
Rescission could be effected at law by unilateral notice and tender if 
the other party did not contest the right to rescind. If the other party 
objected, however, it was necessary to bring a judicial proceeding 
for equitable rescission. Petitioners argue that Congress intended 
to mirror rescission at law, but respondent claims that the actual 
model was rescission at equity, as shown by (1) the separation of 
notice and tender, both which were required for rescission at law; 
and (2) section 1635(g), which provides that a court may award 
rescission. 
Respondent argues that while section 1635(a) provides for the 
borrower to notify the lender of its “intention to rescind,” this does 
not automatically result in rescission. Even under rescission at law, 
the notice did not effectuate rescission absent tender of the benefits 
received by the rescinding party (which is beyond most borrowers 
unless and until the mortgage is voided). The rescission itself, 
respondent argues, is accomplished either through the unwinding 
of the transaction as laid out in section 1635(b)—including return 
of the loan proceeds to the lender—or by an award of rescission 
under section 1635(g). 
Under section 1635(c), if a borrower has signed an 
acknowledgement at closing that the required disclosures and 
notices were received, there is a rebuttable presumption that this is 
true. Such a presumption, respondent argues, has no effect outside 
of litigation, showing that Congress envisioned litigation to resolve 
contested rescission cases. Moreover, it would make no sense, in 
the face of this presumption, to argue that a lender is subject to 
automatic unilateral rescission upon notice from borrowers who, 
like the petitioners here, have signed such an acknowledgement. 
According to respondent, a contrary reading would give absurd 
results, as a borrower could rescind by notice to the lender, who 
would have to cancel the mortgage within 20 days even though 
the lender does not agree that the borrower has a right to rescind. 
Sending such a letter costs little or nothing to the borrower, 
particularly if the loan is already in default and foreclosure, and 
the sender is not subject to the sanctions available for groundless 
lawsuits or defenses. Borrowers could send spurious rescission 
notices within three years, keeping open the possibility of 
bringing suit thereafter and forcing lenders to bring “avoidable 
and unnecessary” declaratory judgment actions to establish the 
enforceability of their loans. 
The unlimited duration of the rescission right, as TILA was initially 
drafted, created just such a cloud on the “titles and enforceability 
of loans,” as a result of which the three-year time limit in section 
1635(f) was added. Respondent asserts that it is a statute of repose 
that operates as an absolute bar because the right of rescission 
is terminated, leaving no cause of action on which to file a suit. 
Petitioner argues that this section merely requires that the borrower 
send a notice of intent to rescind within the three-year period, and 
that no cause of action exists unless and until a lender rejects a 
borrower’s notice of rescission. It is that rejection which gives rise 
to the basis for the suit, petitioners conclude, and thus triggers the 
running of any statute of limitations. 
SIGNIFICANCE
The majority of residential mortgage loans are sold in secondary 
markets and the outcome of this case could affect the marketability 
of mortgages, with ramifications for mortgage availability and 
cost. The securitization industry argues that if a mortgage can be 
automatically voided by the borrower’s notice of intent to rescind, 
risks increase and interest rates will follow. Similarly, a ruling that 
the three-year statute of repose is not an absolute bar and that a 
notice of intent to rescind provided within that period will keep 
the cause of action alive would affect values both by clouding the 
lender’s rights and by increasing overall litigation costs. It should 
be noted, however, that while the parties have tended to merge the 
arguments, there is no inherent reason why the Court could not split 
them, holding that the notice of intent to rescind does not cause an 
automatic rescission where the lender contests it, and that section 
1365(f) does not preclude a subsequent suit provided the notice is 
sent within the three-year window. 
Marshall Tracht is a professor of law at New York Law School. He 
can be reached at mtracht@nyls.edu or 212.431.2139. 
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ATTORNEYS FOR THE PARTIES 
Petitioners Larry D. Jesinoski and Cheryle Jesinoski (David 
C. Frederick, 202.326.7900)
Respondent Countrywide Home Loans (Seth P. Waxman, 
202.663.6000)
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioners Larry D. and Cheryle Jesinoski 
AARP, National Consumer Law Center, American Civil Liberties 
Union, National Association of Consumer Advocates, and Center 
for Responsible Lending (Jean Constantine-Davis, 202.434.2060)
New York, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia 
(Barbara D. Underwood, 212.416.8020)
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United States (Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Solicitor General, 
202.514.2217)
In Support of Respondent Countrywide Home Loans
American Bankers Association, American Financial Services 
Association, Consumer Bankers Association, Consumer Mortgage 
Coalition, Independent Community Bankers of America, and 
Mortgage Bankers Association (Kirk D. Jensen, 202.349.8048)
Professor Richard R.W. Brooks (William M. Jay, 202.346.4000)
Structured Finance Industry Group, Inc. (Frank A. Hirsch, 
919.862.2200)
In October, the Court heard a number of interesting cases. Below we highlight some of the more engaging exchanges between the justices 
and the advocates during Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk (Docket No. 13-433). That case raised the question of whether time spent in 
security screenings is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act. 
Paul Clement (on behalf of the petitioners): And I think two points 
to make here. One is, you know, I think the knife sharpening in 
King Packing, for example, really is indispensable. You can’t run a 
butchering operation without sharp knives. I think you can perfectly 
well run a warehouse facility without egress security. So I think 
these are different.
Justice Elena Kagan: Actually, Amazon, I don’t think you can. I 
mean, what makes it Amazon? It’s a system of inventory control 
that betters everybody else in the business. And what’s really 
important to Amazon is that it knows where every toothbrush in the 
warehouse is. And that’s just as integral to what Amazon does and 
to what it requires its employees to do as, for example, the—I’m 
going back to my hypos—but the person who closes out the cash 
register, the person who closes out the bank teller operation, is 
that this is sort of a necessary part of what the folks who do all the 
stocking and the unshelving and shelving do at Amazon.
Mr. Clement: Well, I guess I would beg to differ, Justice Kagan. 
I think, certainly, everything in the Amazon facility is barcoded 
and the like, and everybody knows where everything is, but 
there’s always the possibility that somebody [did] not barcode 
an incoming item at all and put it in their pocket. Now, if they’re 
doing that, they’re not discharging their principal activities, and 
if they’re detected on the way out, I mean, that might help keep 
the next person on mission, but that doesn’t make it integral and 
indispensable to discharging the primary job duty.
Justice Antonin Scalia: I suppose that it is also necessary to 
Amazon’s business that it know how many hours each of its 
workers has worked, so it knows how much to pay them and 
doesn’t pay them more, right? And—and yet, there’s no doubt 
whatever, is there, that punching in and punching out is not 
preliminary and postliminary, right?
Mr. Clement: I hope there’s no doubt about that, Justice Scalia. 
And I do think that the exit security screenings are just the modern 
analogue of that. Not only do they both come at the employer’s 
insistence and for the employer’s benefit, but they also have this 
process of verifying that the employers are essentially behaving in 
an honest way.
 *  *  *  *
Mark Thierman (on behalf of the respondents): But there are 
employers who say—they’re OCD, they want everyone there till 
8 o’clock, even if you have nothing to do. I’m paying you to stay 
till 8 o’clock, you stay till 8 o’clock. There’s nothing that is coming 
out of that, but yet you are told to stay, so you stay. And there’s no 
function to it. I mean, the employers do things like that or they do 
it for reasons that we don’t know or we won’t understand and we 
don’t care because that’s our system. They are allowed to run their 
business that way. And a corollary of that is that they tell people 
what to do. …Whatever it is, if the employer tells to you do it and 
it’s not within these carveouts, it is compensable. And the drug 
testing is another example. The drug testing is compensable. Why? 
Because your freedom—you’re giving up your time. Your freedom 
isn’t—and you’re doing it because the employer told you to do it.
Justice Antonin Scalia: Suppose the employer has enough stations 
that it just takes a minute to go through. Would you still be making 
the argument that that’s compensable?
Mr. Thierman: If the—if the employees go through in a minute, 
it’s de minimis. And that’s the safety valve or the escape valve. 
First, we decide if it’s work; second, we decide if it’s within the 
postliminary and preliminary carveout; and third, we decide if it’s 
de minimis.
Justice Scalia: Gotcha. Okay. Five minutes?
Mr. Thierman: The Ninth Circuit uses a ten-minute rule. It varies. I 
mean, if it’s constantly done every day for ten minutes exactly, it 
gets close. But three minutes, it’s trivial. 
